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1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in studying collusion among asymmetrically informed
agents, in various settings ranging from internal organization, regulation, auctions, to
oligopolistic competition.1 While most of these studies explore how agents can effectively
collude against exogenously given institutions, a few recent studies have begun to inves-
tigate an optimal organizational/contractual response to agents’ collusion. In particular,
Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) have developed a modeling framework that integrates
collusion as part of the general mechanism design analysis.2 An important insight gained
from this framework is that agents’ asymmetric information imposes transaction costs on
their abilities to carry out collusive arrangements.
Just how far these transaction costs can be exploited in contract design is still unknown.
In procurement/public good settings, Laffont and Martimort (hereafter LM) have shown
that the optimal outcome can be made collusion-proof at no cost to the principal if the
agents’ types are uncorrelated (LM, 1997), but, if the types are correlated, preventing col-
lusion entails strict cost to the principal (LM, 2000). The former result — i.e., collusion is
preventable at no cost with uncorrelated types — is reproduced by Quesada (2004) with a
different coalition formation process, and by Jeon and Menicucci (2005) in a nonlinear pric-
ing model that allows collusive consumers to arbitrage on their purchases. These models
have special structures, though. LM and Quesada (2004) assume two agents with two possi-
ble types and Leontief production technologies/preferences, and Jeon and Menicucci (2005)
assume n ≥ 2 agents with two types or two agents with three types, along with several
preference restrictions.
1Tirole (1986), Baliga and Sjostrom (1998), Celik (2004), Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Marti-
mort (2003), Severinov (2003) and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) study collusion in internal orga-
nization and the value of delegation. Graham and Marshall (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1992), Mailath
and Zemsky (1991), Marshall and Marx (2004), Brusco and Lopomo (2002) and Caillaud and Jehiel (1998)
study collusion in one-shot auctions of various formats, while Aoyagi (2003), Blume and Heidhues (2002),
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and Chung (2003) study collusion in repeated auc-
tions.
2 An earlier literature concerned about coalition formation in Groves mechanisms includes Green and
Laffont (1979) and Cre´mer (1996). The former paper envisions a coalition of symmetrically informed agents,
whereas the latter allows for their possible asymmetric information. While the latter framework resembles
that of Laffont-Martimort and even considers subgroup collusion, it restricts attention to dominant strategy
implementation (at both grand and coalitional mechanism design) and does not consider participation
constraints.
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Intriguing as these results are, their reliance on special structures raises several ques-
tions. First, it is unclear whether the results are generalizable beyond the assumed en-
vironments. Second, even if the results are generalizable, the method of collusion-proof
implementation is specific to the assumed setting, so it does not provide a general method
that may work in other settings. Third, the specificity of the models and the lack of a
general method make it also difficult to isolate the economic insight explaining under what
circumstances collusion is preventable and why it is preventable in those circumstances.
The current paper advances on these fronts by developing a general method for collusion-
proofing a mechanism. Using this method, we show that any payoff attainable by the
principal in the absence of collusion, including the second-best level, can be attained in the
presence of collusion, in a large class of environments with risk neutral agents, for both
uncorrelated and correlated types cases. Our collusion-proof implementation does not rest
on any special assumptions about preferences/technologies or type structures. For example,
the agents’ types can be discrete or continuous (at least for the uncorrelated types case) or
even multidimensional, and no special features on preferences or technology, such as single
crossing, are needed for our results.
Furthermore, our collusion-proof implementation is robust to many aspects of collusion
behavior, such as the identity of the agent organizing/initiating collusion, the manipulation
technology employed by the coalition (e.g., whether the coalition can arbitrage on an initial
allocation), the coalition’s objective and the bargaining power of its members (e.g., whether
the coalition caters to the interests of some agents more than others), and the exact makeup
of the coalition (e.g., whether collusion involves all agents or only some agents). In fact, the
principal need not even know how the collusion operates along many of these dimensions.
Our method of collusion-proof implementation utilizes the idea of “selling the firm to
the coalition.” Specifically, for any expected payoff level that the principal can attain in
the absence of collusion, we construct a new mechanism that gives the principal an ex post
constant payoff equal to the original expected payoff. This mechanism forces the (grand)
coalition to become a residual claimant of the entire surplus, after paying off the principal
an ex post constant surplus, when it manipulates the outcome. That such a mechanism is
implementable in the adverse selection setting is not obvious, and will be an important part
of our analysis. Also not obvious is that such a mechanism, if implementable, is immune
to collusion. In fact, being the residual claimant, the coalition would prefer the first-best
allocation over the intended allocation in case the latter involves distortion, so it will try
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to manipulate so that the former arises. Yet, such a manipulation never succeeds. The
reason is that the coalition faces an asymmetric information problem just like the principal
in the original noncollusive mechanism design. This informational asymmetry means that
an appropriate amount of information rent must be given to the members of the coalition
to implement a particular allocation. But since the principal is paid off to realize a desired
level of surplus irrespective of the induced allocation, implementing any other allocation by
the coalition would violate budget balancing.3 (This intuition will become more transparent
in Section 5, with the aid of a figure.) In short, by making the agents residual claimants,
our mechanism forces them to internalize precisely the same amount of informational cost
that the principal faces in noncollusive mechanism design, and in this sense exploits the
coalitional transaction cost fully.
This idea of collusion-proof implementation does not rely on the agents’ types being un-
correlated, although making the agents residual claimants while preserving their incentives
proves more challenging in a correlated type environment. If there are only two agents,
our method of collusion-proofing indeed does not work, much consistent with LM (2000)’s
finding in their two agents model. With more than two agents, however, given a reasonable
type structure, our collusion-proof implementation works quite generally, implying again
that the principal can attain any noncollusive payoff in a robustly collusion-proof fashion
even with correlation. An important corollary of this result is that the principal can typi-
cally implement the first-best allocation and extract the entire rents from the agents even
in the presence of collusive agents.
We then extend our analysis to consider a mechanism that would prevent collusion by
a subgroup of agents. Although the issue of preventing collusion by a subgroup has rarely
been analyzed before, it is practically relevant since in many settings, only a subgroup of
agents are often in a position to collude. Collusion-proofing in this environment poses a new
challenge since the coalition may prey on noncollusive agents as much as on the principal.
Protecting the interests of noncollusive agents thus becomes an important consideration
for the principal. Our collusion-proof implementation idea generalizes in a remarkable
way to this problem: If at least two collusive agents are identified, then we can construct a
mechanism that can handle any collusion involving these two, including the grand collusion.
3The intuition is the same as the one showing that implementing the first-best allocation would run
a budget deficit in Myerson-Satthertwaite bargaining. The difference is that this problem is endoge-
nously/deliberately created by our design to prevent collusion from being feasible.
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This result strengthens the robustness in the way the collusion problem is thwarted since
the principal need not know the exact size or makeup of the coalition. While this result
requires an additional condition that the outcome must be ex post implementable in the
noncollusive setup (i.e., ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational),
the condition is known to hold in a large class of uncorrelated types environments.
The collusion-proof implementation result also advances our understanding of the value
of hierarchical delegation of contracts. Despite its practical significance, delegation of con-
tracting authority has been difficult to justify, since it involves a loss of control for the prin-
cipal (see Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995), for instance). Whether collusion
can change this view has been the subject of much recent research (see Laffont and Mar-
timort (1998), Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003), Celik (2004), Mookherjee
and Tsumagari (2004)). Since collusion creates control loss even with centralized contracts,
delegation may be relatively more attractive and may even serve as an optimal response to
collusion. This latter conjecture turns out not to be true, however. Our results imply that
collusion imposes no real cost to centralized contracting, which suggests that delegation
cannot be more justifiable in the presence of collusion than in its absence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the idea of the main
results using a simple example. Section 3 describes the model, including the economic
environments studied. Section 4 describes the noncollusive benchmark. Section 5 develops
the notion of robust collusion-proofness. Section 6 constructs a robustly collusion-proof
mechanism that implements any noncollusive payoff for the principal, in the uncorrelated
type environment. Section 7 generalizes the analysis to the correlated type environment.
Section 8 then studies collusion-proofing when only a subset of agents may collude. Section
9 establishes robustness of the result to an alternative modeling of coalition formation.
Section 10 draws implications for hierarchical delegation of contracts. Section 11 concludes.
2 An Illustrative Example
It is useful to begin with an example that illustrates our main idea. Suppose a buyer
procures a good from one of two suppliers, agents 1 and 2. Agent i = 1, 2 can supply
the good at a cost θi, which is drawn uniformly from [0, 1], and the buyer values the good
more than 2. If the agents cannot collude, it is optimal for the buyer to use a standard
auction, such as a second-price auction. (No binding reserve price is employed since the
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seller’s valuation of the object is sufficiently high.) Specifically, the agents bid supply prices,
and the low bidder wins and performs the job at the payment that equals the high bid.
Consequently, the buyer procures the good at the expected price of 2/3, which is the best
the buyer can do, as is well known from Myerson (1981).
Suppose now the agents can collude. It is easily seen that the second-price auction is
susceptible to collusion. Prior to bidding, the firms can organize a knockout auction wherein
the agents bid for the right to participate in the second-price auction uncontested; i.e., the
loser bids 1, and the winner bids his cost.4 Hence, with collusion, the buyer essentially
pays the price of 1 to the winner of the knockout auction.
Now consider a different mechanism. The buyer holds an auction in which the agents
bid for a payment, bi, and again the low bidder wins. The mechanism differs in the payment
arrangement: The buyer pays a fixed amount, 2/3, to the losing (high) bidder, say j, who
then pays the winning bidder its bid bi to perform the job. Intuitively, the losing bidder is
a “prime contractor” who “outsources” the job to the winning bidder and in the process
finances the difference, bi − 2/3.
Absent collusion, the bidding game has a unique equilibrium in which the agents adopt




θ, for each type θ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, the
job is allocated efficiently as in the optimal mechanism, and the buyer procures the good
at the fixed price of 2/3. Since the allocation is the same and the buyer pays the same
on average as in the (noncollusive) second-price auction, the revenue equivalence theorem
implies that the interim payoffs of both firms are the same as in that game. Hence, it
is equilibrium for both agents to participate in the auction game. In sum, the proposed
mechanism implements the optimal procurement policy, in the absence of collusion. More
importantly, the new mechanism is not susceptible to collusion. In the bidding game, the
agents become residual claimants of the social surplus after paying a fixed amount of 2/3
to the buyer. Since the allocation is efficient, they have no incentive to collude in that
bidding game.
This example illustrates the main idea of preventing collusion, namely that of “selling
4More precisely, they can organize a knockout auction in which the agents bid to pay their rivals for
the “uncontested bidding” in the official auction. This knockout auction game has a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which an agent with cost θ bids 13 − 13θ. This equilibrium implements the direct revelation
(strong) cartel mechanism studied by McAfee and McMillan (1992). A similar problem arises with the
first-price auction.
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the firm” to the agents. In what follows, this idea will be used to construct a general
collusion-proof mechanism that works in a more complicated environment. The example
also illustrates another feature of our collusion-proof mechanism, distinguished from the
existing literature (e.g., LM, 1997, 2000). Unlike the traditional approach, our mechanism
guarantees the buyer a desired level of ex post surplus, whether collusion actually occurs or
not. Hence, in the example the buyer could achieve the same outcome, by delegating the
procurement job to a “consortium” of the agents (run by some uninformed third party), at
a fixed price of 2/3; the consortium will then organize its own auction to allocate the job
efficiently. Such delegation may provide a more practically relevant implementation of our
mechanism.
3 Primitives
There are a principal and n ≥ 2 agents, with N := {1, ..., n} representing the total set of
agents. Each agent i has type θi drawn from some arbitrary measurable set Θi. A vector
of realized types is denoted θ := (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ×ni=1Θi =: Θ. Until more specific cases are
considered, we maintain a general assumption that θ is distributed according to some prior
distribution µ0 ∈ ∆Θ. Hence, θ can be discrete or continuous (or a mixture of those), or
multidimensional. The realized value of θi is private information observed only by agent i;
all others, including the principal, only know its distribution along with other aspects of
the game structure. We adopt the following notation: θ˜, θ˜i, θ˜−i represent random variables,
E[·] := ∫
Θ
[·]dµ0(θ˜) and Eθ˜−i [·] :=
∫
Θ−i
[·]dµ0(θi, θ˜−i) are expectation operators based on the
prior distribution; and Eµ[·] :=
∫
Θ
[·]dµ(θ˜) represents an expectation operator based on an
arbitrary probability distribution µ ∈ ∆Θ.
An economic decision is described by x ∈ X , for some arbitrary set X . Given a profile
of types, θ ∈ Θ, and a decision x ∈ X , agent i ∈ N realizes gross surplus of ai(x, θ) and
the principal obtains w(x). We allow for a random decision, so we focus on a probability
measure q on X and call it an allocation. Let Q = ∆X be the set of all allocations (i.e.,
all probability measures on X ). Then, any allocation q (or randomization over x) yields
gross surplus of si(q, θ) :=
∫
X ai(x, θ)dq(x), and of v(q) =
∫
X w(x)dq(x) to agent i and to
the principal, respectively, given type profile θ ∈ Θ.
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All players are risk neutral.5 Hence, given types θ, if allocation q ∈ Q is chosen and the
principal pays ti to agent i in expected value, he receives expected payoff of
si(q, θ) + ti,





If there is no contract, agent i with type θi collects a reservation utility of U i(θi).
Virtually all known adverse selection problems with “quasilinear preferences” satisfy the
above preference and information structure. The following is the list of some well-known
examples.
• Internal organization, procurement and regulation: An employer/regulator procures
a set, K, of goods in varying quantities from a set N of workers/firms. The decision
x := (xki )k∈K,i∈N then represents vectors of goods supplied by the workers. This
situation easily fits into our model, with ai(xi, θi) representing worker i ∈ N ’s payoff
(i.e., negative of cost) associated with supplying a vector of quantities, xi = (x
k
i )k∈K ≥
0 given his realized type, θi, (which can be multidimensional), and w(x) representing
the the seller’s value of procuring x. An allocation then is a probability distribution
over different production assignments.
• Nonlinear pricing: A firm produces/markets a set of goods, K, in varying quantities
to a set N of consumers. This is just the mirror image of the procurement problem,
with a decision x representing the bundles of goods consumed by the buyers, and with
5As will be remarked, our results continue to hold even if the principal is risk averse.
6In several models including LM, the principal is a government agency which cares about the agents’







[si(q, θ) + ti],
for some λ ∈ (0, 1]. This objective function is relevant for a public good problem or Baron and Myer-
son (1982)’s regulation problem where λ > 0 reflects the government’s shadow value of firms’ revenue. Our
method works even in this case for the optimal noncollusive mechanism, but according to the LM’s weak
collusion-proofness criterion, which is weaker than the one that will be developed here. The precise notion
and the result are discussed in Appendix A of our working paper version (Che and Kim (2004)).
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ai(x, θi) representing consumer i’s utility from consumption and w(x) the negative of
firm’s cost of producing x.
• Auctions: An auctioneer allocates a (finite) set of goods or procurement projects,
K, to n bidders and possibly to herself. Let X be the set of all partitions, or “as-
signments,” of K into the set of all players, including the auctioneer. Suppose that
ai(x, θ), i ∈ N , is bidder i’s gross surplus and w(x) is the auctioneer’s gross surplus,
when partition x ∈ X is chosen and the bidders realize types θ. This model covers
many situations of interest, ranging from a one unit IPV (seller or buyer) auction as
the simplest form, to interdependent valuations (seen by the possible dependence of
ai on θ−i), bundling, and Jehiel-Moldovanu-Stacchetti (1999) type allocation exter-
nalities. In such a model, an allocation q = (qx)x∈X denotes a vector of probabilities
of different partitions being chosen, and si(q, θ) =
∑




To describe the sequence of events, it is useful to begin with a time line under a non-
collusive game:
• At date −1, each agent learns his type, θi, which is drawn from Θi.
• At date 0, the principal proposes a mechanism.
• At date 1, each agent either accepts or rejects the mechanism.
• At date 2, the game form proposed in the mechanism is played if the agents all
accepted the mechanism, or else the agents collect their respective reservation utilities.
To study possible collusion among the agents, we follow LM (2000) by considering
possible coalition formation between date 1 and date 2, initiated by a third party7:
• At date 11
4
, a third party proposes a collusive arrangement.
• At date 11
2
, each agent accepts or rejects the collusive mechanism.
• At date 13
4
, the game form specified in the collusive mechanism is played, which
binds the play of the coalition members at date 2, if all agents accepted the collusive
7In Section 9, we will study a variation in which collusion is initiated by one of the agents.
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mechanism at date 11
2
. If at least one agent rejects the collusive mechanism, no
collusion occurs, so the agents play the game at date 2 noncooperatively.
Note that the coalition is formed after the agents make participation decisions. The
implication of this formulation will be discussed in Conclusion. Further details of how
collusion operates will be discussed in Section 5.
4 Benchmark: A Noncollusive Environment
We first analyze the noncollusive game, with no action between date 1 and date 2. Absent
collusion by agents, the Revelation principle guarantees that an equilibrium consequence
of any contract that the principal offer can be studied by a direct revelation mechanism
(DRM). In our setup, a direct mechanism, or shortly “mechanism,” consists of measurable
functions, (q, t) : Θ 7→ Q×Rn, which determines an allocation q(θ) and a vector of transfers
t(θ) = (t1(θ), ..., tn(θ)) to the agents when they report θ ∈ Θ. The function, q(·), is called
an allocation rule, and t(·) is called a transfer rule. Any such pair (q, t) also represents an
outcome realized at each state θ and will be sometimes referred to as an “outcome,” below.
Absent collusion, a mechanism M = (q, t) is feasible if it is individually rational :
(IR) UMi (θi) := Eθ˜−i [si(q(θi, θ˜−i), θi, θ˜−i) + ti(θi, θ˜−i)|θi] ≥ U i(θi) ∀i, θi,
and incentive compatible:
(IC) UMi (θi) ≥ Eθ˜−i [si(q(θ′i, θ˜−i), θi, θ˜−i) + ti(θ′i, θ˜−i)|θi] =: uMi (θ′i, θi), ∀i, θi, θ′i,
where U i(θi) is the reservation utility level of agent i with type θi. Notice that both incentive
compatibility and individual rationality are required at the interim level. Let M be the
set of all feasible mechanisms, i.e., the set of all allocation and transfer rules, M := (q, t),
satisfying (IC) and (IR). We assume that the set M is nonempty.8






8It is reasonable in most of the situations that the principal has an option of offering a null contract, in
which case this assumption holds trivially.
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in which case we say a payoff V is implementable. Let V denote the set of all implementable
payoffs for the principal. Of special interest is the highest implementable payoff, V ∗ =
supV . This payoff, henceforth referred to as “noncollusive optimal” or “second-best” payoff,
is implementable, namely, V ∗ ∈ V , under very weak conditions (see Balder (1996) for
example). Below, we will be interested in the collusion-proof implementability of any
arbitrary V ∈ V , but particularly the second-best payoff V ∗.
For any payoff V ∈ V, there may be more than one mechanism implementing it. For
the most part, how we select a mechanism in such a case does not matter. In a couple of
occasions (Propositions 2 and 3), however, we select a mechanismM = (q, t) that efficiently
implements V ∈ V in the sense that M yields the highest total surplus among all feasible









for any mechanism M ′ = (q′, t′) implementing V . Existence of such a mechanism for any
given V ∈ V involves a restriction but is a very weak one.9 In particular, the second-best
allocation — the allocation rule implementing V ∗ — is often unique, in which case any
optimal mechanism will implement V ∗ efficiently.
5 Model of Collusion and Collusion-Proofness
The Laffont-Martimort model of collusion postulates that the agents can commit, via an
uninformed benevolent representative, to a mechanism that manipulates their reports to
the principal. Below, we will expand this modeling framework to accommodate a much
broader range of collusion possibilities. We will then develop a notion of collusion-proofness
that requires a mechanism to be robust against all such collusion possibilities.
5.1 Modeling Collusive Behavior
We study a collusive arrangement that allows the agents to (1) collectively manipulate
their reports to the principal, to (2) reallocate q assigned by the grand contract and to
9For instance, if the set of allocation rules associated with mechanisms implementing V is compact, then
there exists a mechanism that efficiently implements V since the principal and agents’ payoff functions are
linear in q.
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(3) exchange transfers among the agents in the budget-balanced way. Following LM, we
assume that such an arrangement is enforced by a side contract proposed by a benevolent
representative. By the Revelation Principle, a side contract is described without loss of
generality by a pair of functions, (µ, y) : Θ 7→ ∆Θ × Rn, that maps from the agents’
types into (possibly random) reports they will submit to the principal and side-transfers
they will exchange with one another. Specifically, a side contract (µ, y) asks the agents to
report their types, and, for any profile θ of reported types, it instructs them to randomize
their reports over Θ according to a probability measure µ(θ) and to exchange side-transfers
y(θ) = (y1(θ), ..., yn(θ)) among them. We require a side contract to be budget balanced:∑
i∈N yi(·) = 0.10
For our purpose, it is more convenient to work directly with the outcome that is im-
plemented as a result of enforcing a balanced-budget side contract. Given any grand
mechanism M , we say a mechanism M˜ := (q˜(·), t˜(·)) is a reallocational manipulation of M
if there exists a balanced-budget side contract (µ, y) : Θ 7→ ∆Θ × Rn such that, for each
θ ∈ Θ,
t˜(θ) = Eµ(θ)[t(θ˜)] + y(θ) and v(q˜(θ)) = Eµ(θ)[v(q(θ˜))] (1)
and let RMM denote the set of all reallocational manipulations of M . In words, a re-
allocational manipulation of M is any outcome M˜ = (q˜, t˜) that the coalition can induce
from grand contract M by manipulating the reports from θ via randomization µ(θ) and
reallocating the resulting assignment in any way that gives rise to the same gross surplus
to the principal (the second equation of (1)), and by redistributing transfers to the agents
in a budget-balanced way (the first equation of (1)).
It is worth noting that the second equation of (1) encompasses all standard scenarios
of reallocation. In an auction, for instance, a bidding ring may be able to reallocate the
goods among themselves after they are initially auctioned off by the seller. This power
to reallocate matters only when the good is sold to one of the members, however. The
equation captures (a weaker form of) this restriction. To be more concrete, consider a
single-unit auction with n bidders and a seller with a reservation value of v0 ≥ 0. Suppose
10In fact, all results, except Proposition 1, hold with a weaker, ex ante version of budget balancedness,
i.e., E[
∑
i∈N yi(θ)] = 0. This means that all our collusion-proof implementation method works even
when the coalition is allowed to obtain financing from outside the coalition. Likewise, our collusion-proof
implementation of optimal mechanisms works even when the coalition is allowed to burn money, i.e., with
a weaker requirement
∑
i∈N yi(·) ≤ 0.
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the seller wishes to implement an allocation rule, q(·) = (q1(·), ..., qn(·)), where qi(·) is the
probability of the object being allocated to agent i (as a function of θ). If the bidders can
reallocate the object once it is assigned, they can induce any q˜(θ) = (q˜1(θ), ..., q˜n(θ)) as
long as
∑
i∈N q˜i(θ) = Eµ(θ)[
∑
i∈N qi(θ˜)], for some µ(θ) ∈ ∆Θ; i.e., the probability of at least
one of them getting the good matches that under some (possibly randomized) reports. But
this condition implies















which is precisely what we require under reallocational manipulation. In another example,
as Jeon and Menicucci (2005) or Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) envisioned, consumers
facing nonlinear pricing or suppliers facing nonlinear contracts may be able to reallocate
their initial allocation/assignment to increase their joint surplus. In this case, our equation
corresponds to the restriction that the reallocation cannot affect the total amount of the
goods/outputs being (re)allocated to all consumers/suppliers.
For feasible collusive behavior, we focus on a reallocational manipulation that satisfies
(IC) and (IR), and let
MM := RMM ∩M
be the set of feasible (reallocational) manipulations. Conditions (IC) and (IR) are sensible
properties to assume for coalitional manipulation. First of all, (IC) is necessary as long as
the coalition faces an adverse selection problem, regardless of how the coalition is formed.
For instance, if the coalition is proposed by an (uninformed or informed) agent, the proposal
must be incentive compatible for all agents, including the proposer (see Quesada (2004) and
Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004)). Likewise, (IR) is necessary for a collusion proposal to
be acceptable to the agents in many circumstances. Whether a particular collusion proposal
is acceptable depends on the belief formed when the proposal is (unexpectedly) rejected.
A standard treatment for this is to assume “passivity of beliefs:” i.e., no new inferences
about the agents’ types are made in such an event. Given passive beliefs, a manipulation,
M˜ , would be acceptable if
(IRM) U
M˜
i (θi) ≥ UMi (θi), ∀i,∀θi.
Clearly, any manipulation of M satisfying (IRM) would also satisfy (IR) as long as M
satisfies (IR). Hence, requiring (IR) accommodates all acceptable collusive arrangements
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given passive beliefs, but it also includes arrangements supported by other, possibly ex-
treme, beliefs. In particular, it means that the coalition can hold the members down to the
same outside options, regardless of the principal’s contract offer, thus limiting her ability to
undermine collusion via manipulating their outside options. In fact, endowing the coalition
with the ability to enforce any manipulation subject only to (IC) and (IR) is tantamount
to assuming that the coalition enjoys the same commitment power as the principal. Al-
though some may view this approach as assuming unrealistically powerful collusion, it can
only strengthen our case if our implementation is robust against all such manipulations —
a requirement we formalize as follows:
Definition 1 A mechanism M ∈ M is robustly collusion-proof (or RCP) if every
M˜ ∈MM gives the same expected payoff to the principal as mechanism M . A payoff V ∈ V
is RCP implementable if there exists an RCP mechanism that implements V .
We next explore several features of our collusion-proof notion. Readers who wish to get
to the main results may skip the remainder of this section.
5.2 Implications and Comparison with Existing Notions
• Objective of the coalition:
Our collusion-proofness notion imposes no restriction on the behavioral objective of the











for some α := (α1, ..., αn) : Θ 7→ Rn+. This formulation of the collusion problem encompasses
a broad class of collusion possibilities, nesting many existing formulations as special cases.
For instance, with α(·) ≡ 1, the objective function treats the agents rather symmetrically,
as was assumed by LM. With αi(·) ≡ 1 and αj(·) ≡ 0 for all j 6= i, the representative
caters to the interest of agent i at the expense of others, as will happen if agent i proposes
a contract (see Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004), for instance). In fact, any individually
rational collusion agreement must correspond to some α(·) ∈ A, where A is the set of
all mappings, α : Θ 7→ Rn+. All these possible scenarios are captured in our notion: if
M is RCP, then ∀α ∈ A, every solution of [CM(α)] gives the same expected payoff to the
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principal as mechanism M . In fact, the principal need not even know the precise objective
of the coalition.
• Collusion prevention:
Our collusion-proofness requirement does not rule out collusion occurring on the equi-
librium path, but rather ensures that the principal will not be harmed by collusion, even
if it occurs. Clearly, this latter requirement is all that matters as far as the principal is
concerned. Our requirement is in fact natural when the principal does not know the precise
objective of the coalition (i.e., α). If the principal does know the objective, however, she
can prevent collusion, given RCP:
Proposition 1 If a mechanismM ∈M is RCP, then for each α with a nonempty solution
to [CM(α)], there exists a mechanism Mα that gives the same payoff as M to the principal
and solves [CMα(α)].
Proof: Suppose that M = (q(·), t(·)) is RCP, and let Mα = (qα(·), tα(·)) be a solution
of [CM(α)]. SinceM is RCP,Mα gives the same expected payoff to the principal asM . We
prove that Mα solves [CMα(α)]. Since Mα ∈ RMM , there exists a balanced-budget side
contract (µα(·), yα(·)) such that ∀θ ∈ Θ,
v(qα(θ)) = Eµα(θ)[v(q(θ˜))] and tα(θ) = Eµα(θ)[t(θ˜)] + yα(θ). (2)
Now pick any M˜ = (q˜(·), t˜(·)) ∈ RMMα . Then, there exists a balanced-budget side contract
(µ(·), y(·)) such that ∀θ,
v(q˜(θ)) = Eµ(θ)[v(qα(θ˜))] = Eµ(θ)[Eµα(θ˜)[v(q(
˜˜θ))]]
and
t˜(θ) = Eµ(θ)[tα(θ˜)] + y(θ) = Eµ(θ)[Eµα(θ˜)[t(
˜˜θ)]] + Eµ(θ)[yα(θ˜)] + y(θ),
where the last equalities follow from (2). Note Eµ(θ)[Eµα(θ˜)[·]] = Eµ¯(θ)[·] for some µ¯(θ) ∈
∆Θ and, if we let y¯(θ) := Eµ(θ)[yα(θ˜)] + y(θ), then
∑
i∈N y¯i(θ) = Eµ(θ)[
∑
i∈N yαi(θ˜)] +∑
i∈N yi(θ) = 0, for each θ ∈ Θ. Hence, M˜ is a reallocational manipulation of M , or M˜ ∈
RMM . We have thus shown that RMMα ⊂ RMM , which in turn implies MMα ⊂ MM .
Since Mα ∈MMα , Mα must then solve [CMα(α)].
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• Relationship with other concepts:
The most standard approach follows LM’s weak collusion-proofness. This notion posits
collusion organized by an uninformed third party who manipulates agents’ reports in a way
that is acceptable to the agents given their passive beliefs and maximizes their joint payoffs,
but has no ability to reallocate their assignment. This notion can be formally stated in a
way comprable to RCP. Given any grand mechanismM , say M˜ = (q˜, t˜) is a communicative
manipulation, if there exists a balanced-budget side contract (µ, y) : Θ 7→ ∆Θ × Rn such
that, for each θ ∈ Θ,
t˜(θ) = Eµ(θ)[t(θ˜)] + y(θ) and q˜(θ) = Eµ(θ)[q(θ˜)]. (3)
The second requirement shows inability to reallocate: the agents can influence the allocation
only through manipulating their reports. Letting CMM be the set of all communicative
manipulations, we thus have CMM ⊂ RMM .
Formally, a mechanism M is weakly collusion-proof if it maximizes the objective of
[CM(1)] among all communicative manipulations satisfying (IC) and (IRM). As LM show,
when a mechanism is weakly collusion-proof, its outcome can be sustained in a collusive
environment as a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Our RCP notion encompasses this notion
since we allow for any arbitrary α in the coalition’s objective function and reallocational
manipulations, and we assume (IR) instead of (IRM) for collusive agreements.
11
Proposition 2 If a mechanism M efficiently and RCP implements a payoff V ∈ V, then
it is weakly collusion-proof.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that M is not weakly collusion-proof. Then, there
must be a mechanism M˜ ∈ CMM which satisfies (IC) and (IRM) and generates a higher
(expected) joint payoffs for agents thanM . Since CMM ⊂ RMM and (IRM) implies (IR),
we have M˜ ∈ MM = RMM ∩M. Since M is RCP, M˜ yields the same payoff, V , to the
principal. Consequently, M˜ must generate a strictly higher total surplus than M . But this
contradicts the fact that M efficiently implements V .
Our notion does not subsume LM’s strong collusion-proofness, which requires collusion-
proofness against all possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Our notion allows for a range of
11Jeon and Menicucci (2005) adopt the same notion except that they allow for reallocation by the agents.
Hence, an RCP implementation will imply their notion as well.
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reasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs, including passive beliefs, but it implicitly rules out
some extreme beliefs inconsistent with the agents’ individual rationality.12 Our concept is
also incompatible with a notion that requires agents’ participation constraints to hold at the
ex post, rather than interim, level. Ex post participation constraints are motivated either
by agents’ colluding on participation decisions (Dequiedt (2004)) or by their having an exit
option from the grand mechanism ex post (Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004)). These latter
possibilities are not allowed in our model of collusion, so the ex post participation constraint
is not required in our notion of collusion proofness. Note that these other notions do not
subsume our notion since we require robustness to many aspects of collusion discussed
earlier.
6 RCP Implementation: Uncorrelated Types
We now present our main collusion-proof implementation result. We begin with the case
in which the types are uncorrelated. Except for the type-independence, we maintain the
generality of the environments presented in Section 2.
Theorem 1 Suppose that types are uncorrelated. Then, every V ∈ V is implementable by
a robustly collusion-proof mechanism.
Proof: Fix any V ∈ V , and suppose mechanism M = (q, t) ∈M implements V . We now
construct a RCP mechanism Mˆ = (qˆ, tˆ) ∈ M that also implements V . Define Mˆ = (qˆ, tˆ)
such that qˆ(·) := q(·) and that, for each θ ∈ Θ,
tˆi(θ) := κiv(q(θ)) + Eθ˜−i
[

























12If such beliefs are admitted, the third party representative may be able to force a collusive proposal
that may not guarantee a reservation utility for some agent. This will undermine implementation since the
latter agent will refuse to participate the grand contract.
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Observe first that tˆ(·) gives the same interim transfers to the agents as t(·): ∀i ∀θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ˜−i [tˆi(θi, θ˜−i)] = Eθ˜−i [κiv(q(θi, θ˜−i))] + Eθ˜−i
[










tj(θ˜j, θ˜−j)− κjv(q(θ˜j, θ˜−j))
]]
− ρi
= Eθ˜−i [ti(θi, θ˜−i)]. (5)
It follows from (5) that Mˆ induces the same interim payoffs to the agents as M , so Mˆ
satisfies (IC) and (IR). Further, (5) means that the principal attains the same expected














Consider any arbitrary reallocational manipulation of Mˆ , M˜ = (q˜(·), t˜(·)) ∈ MMˆ . Then,
there exists a balanced-budget side contract (µ, y) : Θ 7→ ∆Θ × Rn such that t˜(θ) =



















where the first and the last equalities follow from the definition of the reallocational ma-
nipulation, the second follows from the budget-balancedness of y(·), and the third follows











thus proving that Mˆ is RCP.
As seen from the proof, two features of our mechanism, Mˆ , are central to its RCP
implementation of an arbitrary mechanism M : First, as seen in (5), Mˆ preserves the same
interim transfers as M , thus satisfying both (IR) and (IC) and giving the same expected
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payoff as M to the payoff. Second, as seen in (6), the transfers tˆi(·) are aggregated so that
the principal collects the ex post constant payoff equal to the expected payoff he would
have enjoyed under M . This feature forces the coalition to become a “residual claimant”
when it manipulatesM , ensuring that the principal will attain the desired payoff regardless
of how the agents behave, once they participate. The first feature, i.e., (IC) and (IR),
guarantees an equilibrium in which the agents indeed participate in the mechanism.
Since every feasible payoff for the principal can be RCP implementable, the following
result is immediate.
Corollary 1 If V ∗ ∈ V, then there exists an RCP mechanism that implements the non-
collusive optimal payoff for the principal.

































Assume for a moment that there is no collusion problem. It is useful to think of the




i∈N si(q˜(θ), θ)], i.e., the sum of all players’ payoffs including that of
the principal. The horizontal axis of Figure 1 depicts all implementable (expected) social
surplus levels, with the highest level marking the first-best level, say.13 Obviously, to
achieve a given social surplus level, say S˜, requires a particular allocation rule, q˜(·), and to
implement the latter in turn requires giving away a certain amount (depicted by A in the
Figure 1) of information rent to the agents. Suppose the difference between the 45 degree
line and the curve below represents the minimal information rent that must be paid to the
agents to implement the corresponding social surplus level. The curve below the 45 degree
line then represents the (expected) surplus accruing to the principal after paying off the
rents to the agents. The figure depicts a common situation in which the principal’s surplus
is maximized at a below-first-best social surplus level, S∗, because of the rent-saving benefit
gained from distorting the allocation.14 In the absence of collusion, the principal would
thus choose to implement S∗.
We now introduce collusion and suppose that the principal proposes mechanism Mˆ .
Given mechanism Mˆ , by inducing (q˜(·), t˜(·)) via manipulation say, the coalition members
receive the joint payoff of∑
i∈N







where the equality follows from (7). Hence, Mˆ forces the coalition to become residual











described in the figure by the maximized level of the curve, PS∗. Hence, given Mˆ , the
coalition receives the difference between the 45 degree line and the horizontal line tangent
at the principal’s maximized surplus, PS∗. Clearly, the mechanism does not eliminate the
potential for coalitional manipulation, since the coalition now prefers SFB over S∗, which
the principal wishes to implement.
13In general, the first-best allocation may not be implementable even in the noncollusive environment.
See Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), for instance. In such a case, SFB should be taken to mean the highest
implementable surplus level.
14This situation is quite common in many mechanism design problems. For instance, an optimal auc-
tion often involves a binding reserve price or handicapping, both of which entail an inefficient allocation.
Likewise, nonlinear pricing often induces too little consumption by the buyers.
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The reason the coalition cannot implement, via manipulation, SFB — or any social
surplus level other than S∗ for that matter — is as follows: Since the coalition faces the
same adverse selection problem as the principal faces in [NC], the amount of information
rents the coalition must pay to the agents is described as before — by the difference between
the 45 degree line and the curve. Under Mˆ , the amount of surplus left to the coalition after
paying off the principal is the gap between the 45 degree line and the horizontal tangent
line, which is strictly less than the information rents needed to implement such a level, for
any social surplus level differing from S∗. If the collusion organizer wishes to implement S˜
(via manipulation), for instance, it will require the information rents of A, but the surplus
left over after paying off the principal is only B, so implementing S˜ would entail a budget
deficit of A−B, and is thus infeasible. Any deviation from S∗ is unimplementable for the
same reason. This is possible precisely because S∗ is optimal for the principal among all
implementable social surplus levels.
Remark 1 For an RCP implementation, the principal need not deal with the agents at
all, opting rather to contract directly with their third-party representative. Fix an RCP
mechanism (tˆ, qˆ) implementing any V ∈ V. The principal can offer a menu {Tˆ (θ), qˆ(θ)}θ∈Θ
to the representative, where Tˆ (·) := ∑i∈N tˆi(·) is a menu of total budgets. Facing such a
contract, the representative will organize the coalition of agents and implement the desired
payoff V for the principal. Absent collusion, such “delegation” would be trivial since the
representative would act just like the original principal. The significance of the delegation
is that it works even in the presence of collusion — i.e., even when the representative cares
intrinsically about the welfare of the agents. In fact, such delegation may provide a practical
way to implement an RCP mechanism. For instance, instead of hiring and supervising
individual suppliers, a buyer may wish to outsource the job to an intermediary (or “prime
contractor”) of organizing and supervising a network of suppliers (or “subcontractors”).
Remark 2 The design of transfer rules in (4) is reminiscent of Arrow-d’Aspremont-Ge´rard-
Varet mechanism (Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont-Ge´rard-Varet (1979)). Their transfers
preserve the incentives of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with zero aggregate transfer.
Ours implements the interim payoffs of any original mechanism with an ex post constant
“surplus” for the principal. Eso and Frutos (1999) suggested a similar transfer rule giv-
ing rise to ex post constant “revenue,” as an optimal mechanism for a risk-averse seller
in a single-unit auction. See also Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape (2005). These mechanisms
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serve much different purposes in their analysis. Nonetheless, our model is more general
and, our mechanism subsumes theirs as a special case (with v(·) being constant). For this
reason, our construction would generalize their results. For instance, our RCP mechanism
implementing V ∗ would be (noncollusive) optimal even if the principal were risk averse.15
7 RCP Implementation: Correlated Types
We now turn to the case in which the agents’ types are correlated. In this case, we already
know from LM (2000) that collusion cannot be prevented for free in a public good model
with two agents and two types. As we show below, however, our collusion-proof implemen-
tation result holds even in a large class of correlated type environments, if there are more
than two agents. Given the well-known result by Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988), this
implies that the principal can extract full rents and implement the first-best outcome even
if collusion is possible.
Consider our general environment in Section 2, but assume that the joint type space,
Θ, is finite. (The finite type space will enable us to utilize linear algebra, as will be seen.)
Specifically, we assume that the support of agent i ∈ N ’s type is given by Θi = {θ1i , ..., θ`ii }
with `i = |Θi| ≥ 2. Let L :=
∏
i∈N `i. It is useful to index all elements of Θ (i.e., all possible
type profiles) in an arbitrary order so that Θ = {θ1, ..., θL}. We then suppose that each type
profile θ ∈ Θ is realized by a joint probability, µ0(θ) ∈ [0, 1] such that ∑θ′∈Θ µ0(θ′) = 1,
with µ0 := (µ0(θ1), ..., µ0(θL))′ representing the vector of joint probabilities of all type
profiles listed in the order mentioned above.
Fix any mechanism M = (q(·), t(·)) ∈M, attainable in a noncollusive environment. As
before, we consider a new mechanism, Mˆ = (q(·), tˆ(·)), that satisfies two properties on the
transfer rule: (a) it satisfies both (IC) and (IR) and yields the same interim transfers to
the agents as M , and (b) it ensures that the principal enjoys an ex post constant surplus
that equals the expected surplus she would enjoy under M .









i , θ−i),∀i and ∀θki , θk
′
i ∈ Θi (10)
15More precisely, the RCP mechanism implementing V ∗ is the unique optimal mechanism for a principal




and (b) holds if ∑
i∈N
tˆi(θ
′) = v(q(θ′))− ρ,∀θ′ ∈ Θ, (11)
where ρ := E[v(q(θ˜)) −∑i∈N ti(θ˜)]. Since t satisfies (IC) and (IR), (10) ensures that tˆ
satisfies (IC) and (IR) and yields the same interim payoffs to all the players as M . Mean-
while, (11) makes the agents residual claimants. Together, these two features guarantee
that Mˆ implements the optimal noncollusive mechanism M in a collusion-proof fashion.
We describe these two restrictions by a system of linear equations. To begin, define for
each i and θki , θ
k′

























i ) denote the interim transfer agent i of type θ
k
i receives when
reporting truthfully and when misreporting to be of type θk
′
i , respectively, given that all
other agents report truthfully. We can then form interim transfer vectors as follows:
Ti := (Ti(θ
k










We next form a vector of transfers for the new mechanism. For each i ∈ N , let
tˆi := (tˆi(θ
1), . . . , tˆi(θ
L))′.
(That is, the elements of the vector are listed in the order of Θ = {θ1, ..., θL}.) Next,
we form a matrix Pi, of size `i × L, which represents the probabilities over the reported
types of all agents when agent i reports truthfully. Specifically, the m-th element of a row
corresponding to Ti(θ
k
i ) has probability µ
0(θki , θ−i) if θ
m = (θki , θ−i), and zero otherwise.
Similarly, a matrix Bi, of size `i(`i − 1)× L, represents the probabilities over the reported





has probabilities µ0(θki , θ−i) if θ
m = (θk
′
i , θ−i), and zero otherwise.











16It is useful to consider a specific example. Suppose there are three agents, and each has two types,
Θi = {1, 2}, i = 1, 2, 3. Suppose Θ is indexed as {111, 112, 121, 122, 211, 212, 221, 222}, where the type
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To combine with the second property, we define a vector of length L:
v − ρ := (v(q(θ1))− ρ, ..., v(q(θL))− ρ)′.
Then, (10) and (11) are described in matrix forms as:





0 . . . Πn





















and IL is the identity matrix of size L.
The next condition proves to be sufficient for the existence of a solution to (12):















Condition (PI′) requires that the spaces spanned by the rows of Πi and those spanned
by the rows of Πj should not intersect except for an one-dimensional vector space, which
accounts for a redundancy in the system of equations.17 Intuitively, it requires that the
profile ijk refers to agent 1 being of type i, 2 of type j and 3 of type k. Then,
P2 =
(
µ0(111) µ0(112) 0 0 µ0(211) µ0(212) 0 0





0 0 µ0(111) µ0(112) 0 0 µ0(211) µ0(212)
µ0(121) µ0(122) 0 0 µ0(221) µ0(222) 0 0
)
,
where µ0(ijk) is the probability of agents 1, 2 and 3 being respectively of types i, j and k. The first and
second rows of the above P2 correspond to T2(1) and T2(2), respectively. The first and second rows of B2
correspond to S2(1, 2) and S2(2, 1), respectively.
17The redundancy comes from an accounting identity associated with the fact that the equilibrium
transfers specified in top and bottom parts of the system must be consistent with each other. To be
specific, if we premultiply the equations of (12) corresponding to Ti by the probability vector µ0
′, we
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untruthful reports by agents i and all possible reports by agent j induce distinct probability
distributions over the entire report profiles, assuming all others report truthfully. This
feature provides the flexibility needed to mimic the incentive design of t and at the same
time makes the agents residual claimants.18
Our main results follow.
Lemma 1 Given Condition (PI′), a solution, tˆ ∈ RnL, to (12) exists.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 2 Given Condition (PI′), every V ∈ V is RCP implementable.
Proof: Fix any M = (q, t) ∈ M. Then, given the Condition (PI′) and Lemma 1, we
can consider a mechanism Mˆ = (q(·), tˆ(·)), where tˆ(·) solves the system of linear equations
in (12). Since tˆ(·) satisfies (10), the interim transfers, and thus interim payoffs, for the
agents are precisely the same under Mˆ as under M , for any possible report each agent may
make, assuming that all other agents report truthfully. This guarantees that Mˆ satisfies
(IC) and (IR) and yields the same interim payoffs to all players as M . Next, since tˆ
satisfies (11), the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 proves that Mˆ is RCP.
obtain the aggregate expected transfers in equilibrium:∑
i∈N
µ0
′ · tˆi =
∑
i∈N









This must be consistent with the restrictions on the aggregate transfers in expected value. In particular,




E[tˆi(θ˜)] = LHS = RHS = µ0







18Similar conditions have appeared in the literature in the context of repeated games and static mech-
anism design with budget balancing (see Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, 1995) and Kosenok and
Severinov (2004)). Pairwise identifiability for a pair of agents i and j, considered by Fudenberg, et al.,
requires the same rank condition, except that Πi represents probability distributions corresponding to dif-
ferent strategies rather than all pairs of reports and states. So Πi has ``ii rows in the pairwise identifiability,
whereas Πi in our (PI′) has `2i rows. In fact, it can be shown that the pairwise identifiability is weaker
than (PI′) in the sense that if (13) holds for a pair of agents i and j, then pairwise identifiability holds for
the same pair. Several conditions proposed by Kosnok and Severinov (2004) are closely related to (PI′).
In fact, the genericity of (PI′) follows from the genericity of one of their conditions, as stated in Lemma 2.
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It can be readily checked that Condition (PI′) fails generically if there are only two
agents. In that case, generically, the RHS of (13) becomes `i`j + min{`2i , `2j} − 1, thus
exceeding the rank of the stacked matrix on its LHS, which equals `i`j generically.
19 This
is consistent with LM (2000), which finds that the principal is strictly worse off from
collusion and that the principal’s optimized payoff is continuous at zero correlation, if
the agents’ types are correlated. The latter finding of LM contrasts with the noncollusive
mechanism design, which displays a discontinuous shift from a typical second-best outcome
to a full-extraction first-best outcome when an arbitrarily small amount of type correlation
is added.
If there are more than two agents, however, Condition (PI′) holds quite generally, so
LM (2000)’s result does not hold.20 The following result due to Kosenok and Severinov
(2004) makes the statement precise.
Lemma 2 (Kosenok and Severinov) Suppose that n ≥ 3 and that, if n = 3, at least one
agent has more than two types. Then condition (PI′) holds for generic µ0(·).21
Proof: This result follows from Step 3 through 5 in the proof of Lemma 3 of Kosenok
and Severinov (2004, pp. 26-28). In particular, they prove that, given the condition, the
matrix on the LHS of (13) has a one-dimensional kernel for a generic µ0(·), for j :=
argmink∈N `k and i := argmink∈N\{j} `k. Hence, (13) holds for that pair, generically.
Given Lemma 2, our collusion-proof implementation holds generically for any n ≥ 3,
with the additional requirement that an agent must have more than two types if n = 3.
It is not difficult to see why adding a new agent makes it easier to satisfy the properties
required for collusion-proofness. Suppose there are two agents with two possible types.
Then the transfer rule specifies 8 transfer amounts: A transfer amount is specified for
each of 4 joint realizations of types for each of the two agents. Meanwhile, the number of
equations required by (12) is 12, so the system has no solution. Intuitively, the transfer
19Generically, each matrix on the RHS has a full rank since different reports by an agent induces a
different distributions over the other agent’s reports when the latter reports truthfully. Hence, the ranks
sum to (`i + `j)min{`i, `j} − 1 = `i`j +min{`2i , `2j} − 1.
20LM’s result with two agents means, however, that collusion will matter again if a subgroup of two
agents are collusive. As will be noted in Remark 1, our method does not generalize to the subgroup
collusion problem, if types are correlated. In this sense, the LM’s point remains valid.
21This condition means that the probability distributions µ0 for which the condition holds has full
Lebesque measure in the n− 1 dimensional simplex.
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rule does not give a sufficient number of degrees of freedom to “sell the firm to the agents”
while preserving the original incentive design of t. As the number of agents increases, the
number of unknowns (the transfer amounts to be specified) increases multiplicatively while
the number of restrictions increases only additively. The reason is that the restrictions
implied by (a) need to hold only at the interim level. To be concrete, suppose that there
is another agent with three types.22 Then, the number of transfer amounts to be specified
grows to 36 (i.e., a transfer specified for each of 12 joint type realizations for each of the
three agents), whereas the number of equations required by (12) grows only to 29. This
creates enough flexibility to satisfy both (a) and (b).23
As is well known from Cre´mer and McLean (1988), the full-extraction first-best outcome
is implementable for generic µ0(·).24 Lemma 2 implies that the outcome is attainable even
in the collusive environment in a broad set of circumstances.
Corollary 2 Given the condition of Lemma 2, for a generic µ0(·), there exists a RCP
mechanism that implements the full-extraction first-best outcome.
8 Collusion by a Subgroup of Agents
So far, we have only considered the possibility of collusion involving all agents. In many
situations, however, only a subset of agents may be in a position to collude. For instance, in
construction procurement auctions in which both local and non-local firms compete, local
firms may be able to collude more effectively, based on their regular contacts and the trade
association relationships. Can such collusion be prevented?
22If the third agent has two types, then the system in (12) has more unknowns than the number of
equations. But, the matrix on its LHS has a two dimensional kernel, whereas the system has only one
dimensional redundancy. So, the solution does not exist generically.
23As footnote 22 indicates, the comparison between the number of equations and unknowns does not
inform us of the existence of a solution because of possible linear dependence across the required equations.
Nonetheless, the comparison is suggestive of how the properties required for collusion-proofness can be
met.
24The full-extraction first-best outcome is defined as in Cre´mer and McLean (1988). In our context, it







for all θ ∈ Θ. The conditions for that outcome to be implementable is shown to be generic.
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Preventing collusion by a subgroup of agents introduces a new consideration in mecha-
nism design, since one has to consider the effect of collusion on the incentives of noncollusive
agents. In particular, a coalition may gain from preying on the noncollusive agents by shift-
ing rents away from them.25 Hence, an important element of a collusion-proof mechanism
is to protect noncollusive agents’ interests/incentives appropriately. This section discusses
how the basic idea of collusion-proof implementation generalizes to this case. We again
restrict the economic environment to uncorrelated types; a remark will be made later on
the correlated types case.
We begin with the model of subgroup collusion. To this end, consider a coalition,
C ⊂ N , of agents with 1 < |C| ≤ n. The time line of the game and its modeling framework
are analogous to the case with collusion by the grand coalition. Hence, the robust collusion-
proofness concept generalizes naturally to this partial collusion case. To begin, we define a
side contract among coalition C, called a C-side contract, by a pair of functions, (µC , yC) :
ΘC 7→ ∆ΘC × R|C|, where µC determines the probability distribution of reports on the
coalition’s types in ΘC . Then, for any direct mechanism M = (q(·), t(·)), we call M˜ =
(q˜(·), t˜(·)) ∈ M its reallocational manipulation by C if there exists a balanced-budget C-
side contract, (µC , yC) : ΘC 7→ ∆ΘC × R|C|, such that ∀θ
t˜i(θ) =
{
EµC(θC)[ti(θN\C , θ˜C)] + y
C
i (θC), if i ∈ C
EµC(θC)[ti(θN\C , θ˜C)], if i ∈ N\C,
(14)
v(q˜(θ)) = EµC(θC)[v(q(θN\C , θ˜C)] (15)
and
si(q˜(θ), θ) = EµC(θC)[si(q(θN\C , θ˜C), θ)], ∀i ∈ N\C. (16)
Note that a reallocational manipulation is required to be undetectable not only to the
principal (see (15)) but also to the noncollusive agents (see (16)). In a single unit auction
with 2 collusive bidders and 1 noncollusive one, for instance, the latter restriction means
that reallocation of the object between the two colluders is possible only when the object
is initially assigned to one of the two collusive bidders.26
25Whether this problem arises depends on the grand mechanism in place. For instance, if a subset of
bidders collude in a first-price auction, this may actually benefit noncollusive bidders.
26Consider for instance a single-unit interdependent value auction in which a bidder i = 1, 2, 3 realizes
the valuation of ai(θ1, θ2, θ3) from winning the good (and zero for not winning), and suppose for simplicity
that the seller never retains the good. Then, the reallocation ability by a coalition C = {1, 2} means that
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Similar to the grand coalition case, we say that a reallocational manipulation of M by
coalition C, M˜ , is feasible if it satisfies
(IRC) U M˜i (θi) ≥ U i(θi), ∀i ∈ C, θi,
and
(ICC) U M˜i (θi) ≥ uM˜i (θ˜i, θi), ∀i ∈ C, θi, θ˜i,
and letMCM denote the set of all feasible reallocational manipulations ofM by coalition C.
Note that a feasible reallocational manipulation by the coalition need not satisfy incentive
compatibility and individual rationality of the agents outside that coalition, since the latter
does not care about the noncollusive agents. Instead, we impose these conditions as part
of the coalition-proofness requirements.
Definition 2 A direct mechanism M is robustly collusion-proof (or RCP) with re-
spect to coalition C ⊂ N if MCM ⊂ M and every manipulation in MCM gives the same
expected payoff to the principal as mechanism M .
The notion of collusion-proofness here is essentially the same as before, except for
the additional requirement that every reallocational manipulation by a coalition must be
also incentive compatible and individually rational to noncollusive agents.27 The extra
requirement is added to protect the interests/incentives of the noncollusive agents against
possible manipulation by the coalition, thus ensuring their participation and ultimately the
intended payoff of the principal. Suppose the subcoalition wishes to induce a manipulation
M˜ = (q˜, t˜) ∈ MCM that violates either incentive compatibility or individual rationality of
some noncollusive agent. If such a manipulation is anticipated, then the latter agent may
a resulting allocation q˜ must satisfy, ∀θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3),
q˜1(θ) + q˜2(θ) = q1(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3) + q2(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3)
for any manipulation (θ˜1, θ˜2) by C. It then follows that
s3(q˜(θ), θ) = (1− q˜1(θ)− q˜2(θ))a3(θ) = (1− q1(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3)− q2(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3))a3(θ) = s3(q(θ˜1, θ˜2, θ3), θ),
which implies (16).
27This requirement is superfluous in the case of the grand coalition since a feasible manipulation is
assumed to satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality for all agents.
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lie about his type or not participate in M , in which case the principal may not receive the
same expected payoff as M .
The additional requirement in collusion-proofness translates into an additional prop-
erty to satisfy in mechanism design. We say a mechanism M = (q(·), t(·)) is ex post
implementable, if it is ex post individually rational :
si(q(θi, θ−i), θ)− ti(θi, θ−i) ≥ U i(θi), ∀i,∀θi,∀θ−i (17)
and ex post incentive compatible:
si(q(θi, θ−i), θ)− ti(θi, θ−i) ≥ si(q(θ′i, θ−i), θ)− ti(θ′i, , θ−i), ∀i,∀θi,∀θ′i,∀θ−i. (18)
Let VEP denote the set of payoffs that the principal can attain by ex post implementable
mechanisms. Clearly, VEP ⊂ V . Later, we provide a more clear sense about VEP by
presenting a sufficient condition for ex post implementability.
Theorem 3 Suppose the types are uncorrelated, and fix any two agents i, j ∈ N . Then,
any V ∈ VEP is implementable by a mechanism that is RCP with respect to any coalition
C containing {i, j}.
Proof: Fix any V ∈ VEP , and suppose M = (q, t) ∈ M ex post implements V .
For any two agents, i, j ∈ N , we construct a new mechanism, M¯ij ∈ M, that would RCP
implement V . Let a mechanism, M¯ij := (q(·), t¯(·)), be such that, for each k 6= i, j, ∀θ,
t¯k(θ) = tk(θ),






































and symmetrically for j; i.e., t¯j defined exactly the same with the roles of i and j switched.
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Observe first that, ∀k, ∀θk ∈ Θk,
Eθ˜−k
[
t¯k(θk, θ˜−k)] = Eθ˜−k [tk(θk, θ˜−k)
]
, (19)
so M¯ satisfies (IC) and (IR) and attains the same value as M . Hence, M¯ implements V .
We next show that M¯ is RCP with respect to any coalition C containing agents i and j.
To show this, fix any such coalition C and choose any feasible reallocational manipulation of
M¯ by C, say M˜ = (q˜(·), t˜(·)) ∈MC
M¯
. Then, there exists a balanced-budget C-side contract
(µC(·), yC(·)) satisfying (14), (15) and (16). Further, M˜ satisfies (ICC) and (IRC), so it is
incentive compatible and individually rational for any collusive agent in C. Consider now
any k ∈ N\C. Then, ∀θk, θ′k ∈ Θk,∀θ−k ∈ Θ−k,
sk(q˜(θk, θ−k), θ) + t˜k(θk, θ−k) = EµC(θC)[sk(q(θk, θN\C−k, θ˜C), θ) + t¯k(θk, θN\C−k, θ˜C)]
= EµC(θC)[sk(q(θk, θN\C−k, θ˜C), θ) + tk(θk, θN\C−k, θ˜C)]
≥ EµC(θC)[sk(q(θ′k, θN\C−k, θ˜C), θ) + tk(θ′k, θN\C−k, θ˜C)]
= sk(q˜(θ
′
k, θ−k), θ) + t˜k(θ
′
k, θ−k),
where the first and last equalities follow from (14) and (16), the second follows from the con-
struction of t¯k for k ∈ N\C, and the lone inequality follows from ex post implementability
of M . Likewise, ∀k ∈ N\C, ∀θk, θ−k,
sk(q˜(θ), θ) + t˜k(θ) = EµC(θC)[sk(q(θk, θN\C−k, θ˜C), θ) + tk(θk, θN\C−k, θ˜C)]
≥ EµC(θC)[Uk(θk)] = Uk(θk).
These inequalities prove that M˜ is also incentive compatible and individually rational for
agent k ∈ N\C. In sum, M˜ must satisfy (IC) and (IR). Since M˜ is an arbitrary element
of MC
M¯
, this proves that MC
M¯
⊂M.























= EµC(θC)[v(q(θN\C , θ˜C))−
∑
k 6=i,j













where the first equality follows from (14), the second from the budget-balancedness of the
side contract, the third from (14) and the switching of expectation and summation, the








ti(θ˜)] = V, (20)
proving that M˜ implements V . We thus conclude that M¯ is RCP with respect to C.
According to this proposition, the principal need to identify only two members of any
possible coalition to handle any collusion involving the two, including the grand collusion.
Hence, neither the principal nor any noncollusive agents need to know the precise size or the
membership of the coalition, as long as two core members of collusion are identified. The
RCP mechanism that does this has three features: (1) As before, the mechanism involves
the selling of the firm to the agents as a whole, thus ensuring an ex post constant surplus
to the principal, (2) Unlike before, the mechanism forces the two chosen agents to bear
the principal’s payment risk toward all other agents, and (3) All other agents’ incentive
compatibility and participation utility are preserved at the ex post level, for all feasible
reallocational manipulations by coalition including the two agents. Features (2) and (3)
ensure the participation of noncollusive agents, which, along with (1), ensures the target
level of surplus to the principal.28 The last feature, (3), requires ex post implementability
of an outcome. Although that requirement limits the class of allocations/environments
to which the above result applies, many plausible environments are known to be in that
class. For instance, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) [Proposition 2] and Chung and
Ely (2003) [Proposition 4] provide the following sufficient condition.
Lemma 3 (Mookherjee-Reichelstein & Chung-Ely) Suppose Θi ≡ [θi, θi] (i.e., one dimen-
sional support) and U i(θi) = U i for all i ∈ N . Then, for any allocation rule q(·) such
28Given that the original mechanism is ex post implementable, a mechanism satisfying (1) can be made








i, θ−i), θ) is nonnegative and nondecreasing in θ
′
i,∀i,∀θi,∀θ−i, (21)
there exists a transfer rule t(·) such that M = (q, t) is ex post implementable.29
Corollary 3 If any V ∈ V is implementable by M whose allocation rule satisfies the
properties of Lemma 3, then, for any two agents i, j, V is implementable by a mechanism
that is RCP with respect to any C containing i and j.
The assumed properties in Lemma 3 hold at the optimal mechanism in many well-known
mechanism design problems, such as auctions, procurement, regulation, nonlinear pricing
and public goods provision.30 While the sufficient condition presumes a continuous type
space, a discrete type problem can be reformulated as a continuous type problem without
any loss (see Skreta (2004), for example). Hence, the result applies to all existing models
of collusion.
Remark 3 (Correlated Types and Subgroup Collusion) We conjecture that a version of
Theorem 3 holds generically in a large class of correlated types cases, with |C| ≥ 3. Ex post
implementability appears problematic, however. Even though ex post incentive compatibility
alone seems feasible generically (see Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992)), that requirement
combined with ex post individual rationality is difficult to satisfy for the full-extraction first-
best outcome. Whether and at what cost collusion by a subset of agents can be prevented
remains an open question in the correlated type environment.
29While Proposition 2 of Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) from which this lemma is adapted does not
prove ex post individual rationality, it is implied as Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) and Chung and
Ely (2003) argue since the first condition implies that there is a single worst type.
30The connection with literature can be made more clear with the following sufficient conditions due to
MR:
(i) One-dimensional condensation: There exists hi : Q → R and di(·, ·) : R×Θ→ R, twice differentiable,
such that si(q, θ) = di(hi(q), θ).




(iii) Ex post monotonicity: ∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i, hi(q(θ−i, ·)) is nondecreasing.
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9 Collusion Proposed by an Informed Agent
Previous sections have employed the LM’s modeling approach whereby a third party rep-
resentative organizes a collusive agreement on behalf of members of the coalition. Even
though this approach serves as a useful metaphor and we have allowed for a variety of
scenarios within this approach, this modeling assumption may not be most descriptive of
a typical collusion process. In a typical situation, a member of coalition may initiate and
propose a collusive agreement. We consider this latter scenario in the current model. The
obvious difficulty with modeling this latter scenario is the “informed principal problem,”
since the agent proposing a collusive scheme is privately informed of his type, and may thus
want to use a contract offer to signal his type to the other agent. The implications of such
problems for coalition formation as well as for the principal’s response to collusion have
not been studied, except for the recent work by Quesada (2004). She finds the second-best
outcome to be collusion-proof implementable, in the LM setting with a binary type and a
perfect complementarity technology.31 Her result exploits special features of that setting,32
however, leaving the generality of her result in question. We show below that our RCP
design can be made to prevent collusion proposed by an informed agent, in a much more
general setting.33
To begin, we assume that there are only two agents and that agent 1 (instead of a third
party representative) makes a take-it-or-leave-it collusion offer to the other agent at date
11
4
. The rest of the structure remains the same as before. The analysis of this game, much
like Quesada, involves applying Maskin and Tirole (1992)’s characterization of informed
principal problem (Theorem 1∗ in page 35), with agent 1 taking the role of the informed
principal in their setup. Their characterization assumes two agents (i.e., one principal and
31Quesada (2004) also considers ex ante collusion (on participation decisions) and finds that the second-
best outcome is not collusion-proof implementable.
32The features of the LM model allows the second-best outcome to be collusion-proof implementable via
ex post individually rational dominant strategies.
33A structurally similar problem is “resale” following an auction. Similarly to our problem, the winning
bidder is informed about the his type when dealing with the losing bidders in the resale market. In the
resale problem, however, the (resale) contract proposal is made after the initial assignment, whereas the
collusion proposal is made prior to the “play” of the grand mechanism. This difference turns out to matter.
Since the bidders’ types are updated after initial allocation, the crucial issue facing the principal is how
to “manipulate” the updating of types through initial assignment (see Zheng (2002)). This issue does not
arise in our problem.
34
one agent) and finite types distributed independently across the agents. Using their result
thus requires us to restrict our model accordingly. Specifically, each agent i = 1, 2 draws
a type independently from a finite set. We further assume that the second-best outcome
is efficiently implementable via an ex post incentive compatible mechanism.34 As noted in
Lemma 3, this set includes most of the cases considered in the literature.
Proposition 3 Suppose there are only two agents each with types drawn independently
from a finite set. If there is a mechanism M∗ which efficiently implements V ∗ and is
ex post incentive compatible, then there exists a RCP mechanism that admits a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which agent 1 (proposer) offers a null side contract to agent 2 and
the principal receives the payoff of V ∗.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Here, we sketch the main idea behind the result. The mechanism used in this proposi-
tion, much like that of Theorem 1, implements the noncollusive optimal outcome in a way
ex post incentive compatible for agent 2, and guarantees the principal ex post constant
surplus of V ∗. The ex post incentives for agent 2 means that each type of agent 1 (the pro-
poser) can earn the noncollusive payoff, regardless of what other types do, by offering the
null side contract. This payoff is also the most it can earn from offering any side contract
that is incentive compatible for agent 1 and ex post incentive compatible for agent 2 and
guarantees the noncooperative payoff to agent 2. In such a case, Maskin and Tirole (1992)
ensures that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium supporting that outcome.
While the result holds for the case of n = 2, the proof does not depend on that fact.
Theorem 1∗ (and Theorem 1) of Maskin and Tirole (1992) also appears to extend to the
case of more than two agents. We thus conjecture that the result holds for more than two
agents.
Neither the argument of Proposition 3 nor the result of Maskin and Tirole appears to
readily extend to the case of correlated types, however. Nevertheless, we offer another
result that will be useful for that case. Consider our general model with n ≥ 2 and an
arbitrary type distribution. Given the condition of Lemma 2, the full-extraction first-best
result is generically RCP implementable. The next result implies that such an outcome is
collusion proof implementable even when an informed agent proposes collusion.
34This is weaker than assuming V ∗ ∈ VEP , given that VEP also requires ex post individual rationality.
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Proposition 4 Suppose a mechanism M∗ = (q∗, t∗) ∈ M satisfies (6) (or equivalently,






si(q, θ),∀θ ∈ Θ. (22)
The mechanism M∗ admits a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which agent 1 offers a null
side contract to other agents and the outcome M∗ is implemented.
Proof: See Appendix C.
10 Hierarchical Delegation of Contracts
Part of an interest in studying collusion stems from the hope it may offer for explaining
some organizational forms that are otherwise difficult to justify. Hierarchical delegation of
contracts is one such organizational practice. If a principal delegates to say agent 1 the
authority to contract with agent 2, then the principal loses the opportunity to communicate
with the latter and to choose his contract terms in her best interest. This control loss
makes delegated contracting difficult to justify, despite its popularity. One can at best hope
delegated contracting to do as well as centralized contracting — i.e., implement the second-
best outcome. If agents’ types are uncorrelated, Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1995) (hereafter, MMR) show that delegation achieves the second-best outcome if and
only if, under delegation, (a) the principal monitors individual output contributions by
all agents (q in our model); and (b) agent 1 can be compelled to make his participation
decision before he communicates with agent 2.35 Condition (a) is needed for the principal
to be able to counteract a potential monopoly distortion that may arise from the increased
bargaining power gained by agent 1. Condition (b) is needed for the individual rationality
to hold at the interim level, so as to prevent agent 1 from commanding rents based on the
information he learned about agent 2.
Does collusion make a difference? While centralization still confers (weakly) more con-
trol to the principal than does delegation,36 the latter seems relatively more attractive
35These conditions are “necessary” for equivalence in the sense that a counter example can be found
where failure of either condition leads to nonequivalence (see MMR). Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001)
also extend the sufficiency part to the case with any finite number of agents.
36Specifically, a centralized contract may enable the principal to manipulate agents’ opportunity cost
36
when the former is subject to collusion. To what extent collusion justifies hierarchical del-
egation has been the subject of much recent research, but no general answer has emerged
yet. Some authors established equivalence in some cases (Laffont and Martimort, 1998;
Faure-Grimaud et al., 2003) while others showed nonequivalence in other cases (Celik, 2004;
Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004). Our collusion-proof implementation results (under cen-
tralization) enable us to provide some general answer on the issue and fill an important
gap in the literature.
Specifically, we have shown that the second-best outcome is achievable under central-
ization in the presence of collusion, whether it is organized by a third party (Corollary 1)
or by an informed agent (Propositions 3 and 4). Hence, for delegated contracting to do
as well as centralized contracting, the former must implement the second-best outcome. It
then follows from MMR that, for uncorrelated types, delegation is inferior to centralization
unless conditions (a) and (b) both hold. In other words, conditions (a) and (b) continue
to be the relevant requirements for equivalence, even in the presence of collusion.
This perspective explains some of the existing results. For instance, Laffont and Mar-
timort (1998)’s equivalence result follows immediately from the MMR’s conditions being
satisfied in their model. In particular, their perfect complementarity technology makes it
trivial for the principal to observe agents’ individual outputs. Also consistent with our
perspective, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) showed delegation to be strictly inferior if
agents can reallocate output and the agent 1 can postpone his participation decision until
after he communicates with agent 2 — i.e., both conditions (a) and (b) fail.37
Thus far, no result is available for the case where only one of the MMR condition
holds. For instance, whether delegation is optimal is not known for the standard case where
agents’s participation constraints hold at the interim level but their technologies/preferences
are general enough to admit nontrivial reallocational opportunities for the agents. Our re-
sults provide an unambiguous answer for this case. It follows from MMR that the agents’
reallocational ability, when undetected by the principal, leads to a monopoly distortion
under delegation. By contrast, the agents’ reallocational ability does not prevent the prin-
cipal from achieving the second-best outcome via a centralized contract. Hence, delegation
of participating in collusion since it will determine their status quo payoffs. The principal enjoys no such
leverage relative to agent 2 under delegation.
37Our result does not imply theirs, however, since their model of collusion under centralization permits
colluding agents to exit from the grand contract after communicating with each other, so their participation
constraints hold ex post even for centralized contracting.
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is strictly inferior in this case.38 In sum, our results suggest that hierarchical delegation is
no more justifiable when the agents are collusive than when they are not, at least if their
types are uncorrelated.
Remark 4 (Correlated Types and Delegation) Our result offers no general perspective
when agents’ types are correlated, since there is no MMR-like result for the no collusion
benchmark. Faure-Grimaud et al (2003) and Celik (2004) consider models in which a non-
productive supervisor observes an imperfect signal about the type of a productive agent.
Differences in the informational structures have led them to reach different conclusions on
the value of delegation. In both cases, however, conditions (a) and (b) are met. In par-
ticular, the non-productive role of supervisor makes condition (a) trivial. If the supervisor
also had a productive role, there could be additional distortion associated with delegation,
rendering it unambiguously inferior.
11 Conclusion
We have shown that the optimal noncollusive mechanism can be made collusion-proof in
a broad class of circumstances, including both uncorrelated and correlated types environ-
ments, in a way robust to the specifics of coalition’s objective, its manipulation technique
or its exact makeup. This result unifies several observations scattered in the literature and
provides a general insight into how the transaction cost associated with agents’ private
information can be exploited to overcome collusion. An equally valuable lesson from the
current paper may lie in furthering the understanding of the true scope of collusion. While
the mechanism we propose applies to a general class of technologies, preferences, and the
agents’ type structures, it requires several important conditions. Recognizing these condi-
38The comparison could in principle depend on how one models collusion under centralized contracting.
Laffont and Martimort (1998) for instance invoke the third-party-initiated collusion which treats the agents
symmetrically in terms of their relative bargaining power. Since a delegated agent has the full bargaining
power under delegation, the latter then involves a shift in bargaining power within the agents as well as
the usual control loss for the principal. Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) adopt a different model where
a collusive proposal is made by one agent (agent 1 in our discussion) in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion under
centralization, so that the two formats differ only in terms of the principal’s control loss. Regardless of
the differences, our result implies that the second-best outcome is achievable under centralization. So, the
non-equivalence result is quite robust.
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tions can shed some light on the factors that can make collusion truly problematic.39
First, we followed the extensive form of LM (1997, 2000) in which a coalition is formed
after the agents sign up for the principal’s grand contract. This means that we do not
allow the agents to collude on their participation decisions.40 While this assumption makes
sense in many situations, there are circumstances in which agents may be able to collude
prior to their participation decisions. To illustrate, consider our example in Section 2 and
our collusion-proof mechanism which charges the agents 2/3. If they can collude prior to
participating in such a mechanism, they may refuse to participate whenever their costs
exceed 2/3, which will undermine the implementation of the second-best outcome. What
form of contract, and to what extent, can deal with such an early collusion remains an
important question to study.41
Second, our collusion-proof implementation relies largely on the risk neutrality of the
agents. An important feature of our mechanism is that it makes the agents residual
claimants, which means shifting all payoff risks (i.e., the payoff variability) to the agents.
Imposing such risks requires providing a risk premium to the agents if they are risk averse.
Similarly, our mechanism may sometimes require positive entry fees, which agents may
be either unwilling or unable to pay, due to their risk aversion or liquidity constraints.
Risk aversion and liquidity constraints will thus introduce a real tradeoff in dealing with
collusion.42
Third, our collusion-proof implementation relies on a Bayesian mechanism, which can-
not generally be made either dominant strategy or ex post implementable for all agents. As
39When these conditions fail, our method of collusion-proofing may not provide a useful guide for solv-
ing the collusion problem, and the traditional approach of optimizing within the class of collusion-proof
mechanisms may again be useful. In this sense, the current paper complements the existing approach.
40 This assumption may not be as restrictive as it may appear. Many forms of collusion involving
coordinated participation is replicable by a collusive arrangement in our model. For instance, McAfee
and McMillan (1992) consider collusion that sends only one selected bidder to the official auction. This is
replicated by an arrangement that sends all bidders but have all of them (except possibly for one) bid a
reserve price. The good can be then reallocated to the selected winner, if necessary.
41A few interesting papers have already employed an extensive form that permits agents to collude on
their participation decisions. See Che and Kim (2005), Dequiedt (2004), Pavlov (2004), Quesada (2004)
and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004).
42The logic is precisely the same as why “selling the firm to an agent” does not work in the traditional
moral hazard model with a risk averse agent. Faure-Grimaud, et al. indeed shows the risk aversion can
make collusion costly to deal with.
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is often recognized, common knowledge required for Bayesian implementation is demand-
ing. Relaxing this restriction will likely entail a real cost of preventing collusion. The exact
nature of this cost and the method of minimizing it remain interesting open questions.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
We use the following theorem.
Theorem of The Alternative (Fredholm):43 For a matrix A and a vector a, the
linear system Ax = a has a solution x∗ if and only if, for any vector λ, λA = 0 implies λa =
0.





i=1 and any (row) vector ξ,
λPi Pi + λ
B
i Bi + ξ = 0,∀i implies
∑
i∈N
λPi · Ti +
∑
i∈N
λBi · Si + ξ · [v −∆] = 0. (23)
Note that λPi , λ
B
i , and ξ are of sizes `i, `i(`i − 1), and L, respectively
To prove (23), suppose λPi Pi − λBi Bi + ξ = 0 for all i, which implies
λPi Pi + λ
B
i Bi = λ
P
j Pj + λ
B
j Bj = −ξ. (24)
Let agents i and j be the ones satisfying Condition (PI′). The condition means that the
space spanned by row vectors of Pi and Bi have only one dimensional vector space in
common with the space spanned by row vectors of Pj and Bj. According to (24), ξ must
belong to this one dimensional space. However, we have
e′1P1 = · · · = e′nPn = µ0′,
where ei is the (column) vector of size `i whose elements are all 1’s. Thus, it must be that




λPi · Ti =
∑
i∈N
λPi Pi · ti = −
∑
i∈N
[λBi Bi + ξ] · ti = −
∑
i∈N












43See Carter (2001), p. 392, for instance.
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Also,


























Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
As stated in the text, our proof applies Theorem 1∗ of Maskin and Tirole (1992). This
requires developing two welfare concepts. To this end, we define several notations. For
each θi ∈ Θi, let p0i (θi) denote the probability that agent i = 1, 2 realizes that type. As
before, µ := (p1(·), p2(·)) denotes an arbitrary prior distribution of types and µi := pi(·)
denotes the prior for agent i = 1, 2. We reserve µ0 := (p01(·), p02(·)) and µ0i := p0i (·) for true
priors. Let
uMi (θ˜1, θ˜2|θ1, θ2) := si(q(θ˜1, θ˜2), θ1, θ2) + t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
denote agent i’s ex post payoff from mechanism M = (q, t) when the agents have types
(θ1, θ2) but report (θ˜1, θ˜2). For each θ1 ∈ Θ1, we let Mθ1 := (q(θ1, ·), t(θ1, ·)) denote a
component of a menu corresponding to a report of type θ1 by agent 1. Hence, we can write
M = {Mθ1}θ1∈Θ1 .
As before, we fix an arbitrary grand mechanism M = (q, t) offered by the principal and
consider a reallocational manipulation of M proposed by agent 1. We first define so called
interim efficiency. A reallocational manipulation of M , Mˇ , is said to be interim efficient


















































2 (θ1, θ2|θ1, θ2),∀θ2 ∈ Θ2.
Next, a reallocational manipulation ofM , M˜RSW (M), is said to be RSW ∗ relative to M








1 (θ1, θ2|θ1, θ2)
subject to (IC1),
(EPIC2) uM˜2 (θ˜1, θ2|θ˜1, θ2) ≥ uM˜2 (θ˜1, θ2|θ˜1, θ′2),∀θ˜1 ∈ Θ1,∀θ2, θ′2 ∈ Θ2.
(EPIR2M) u
M˜
2 (θ˜1, θ2|θ˜1, θ2) ≥ uM2 (θ˜1, θ2|θ˜1, θ2),∀θ˜1 ∈ Θ1,∀θ2 ∈ Θ2.
Theorem 1∗ of Maskin and Tirole (1992) proves that, if an RSW ∗ mechanism is IE∗
relative to some positive prior, then any mechanism that satisfies (IC), (IR) and weakly
Pareto-dominates the RSW ∗ for agent 1 is supported as an equilibrium of the game where
agent 1 proposes a contract to agent 2. We apply this result to prove Proposition 3. By
the hypothesis, there exists an ex post incentive compatible mechanism M∗ = (q∗, t∗) that
implements V ∗ efficiently. We now construct mechanism M¯ = (q∗, t¯), where
t¯2(θ) := t
∗










and for agent 1,
t¯1(θ) := −t¯2(θ) + v(q∗(θ))− Eθ˜1 [ρ(θ˜1)]. (26)
As can be seen from (26), the transfers sum up to a level that ensures an ex post constant
payoff of Eθ˜1 [ρ(θ˜1)] = V
∗ to the principal. Further, these transfers ensure the same interim
payoffs for both agents and the same ex post incentive for agent 2, as t∗. Hence, M¯ is RCP.
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Suppose the principal offers M¯ . By construction, M¯ is ex post incentive compatible
for agent 2. This means that M¯ satisfies the constraints of [RSW ∗θ1(M¯)] for each θ1 ∈ Θ1.
Hence, each type θ1 of agent 1 can guarantee interim payoff of U
M¯
i (θ1) by offering M¯ , i.e.,
the null side contract, implying that the payoff for each type of agent 1 from an RSW ∗
mechanism relative to M¯ must be at least that of M¯ . At the same time, the RSW ∗
mechanism relative to M¯ must be a reallocational manipulation of M¯ , so it gives V ∗ to the
principal (by design of t¯), and it must satisfy (IC) and (IR),44 so it must be noncollusive
optimal. Since M¯ has the same allocation rule asM∗, M¯ must also implement V ∗ efficiently.
Then, the RSW ∗ payoff for each type of agent 1 must equal that of M¯ . Or else, there must
be an reallocational manipulation of M¯ that gives strictly higher payoff to some type of
agent 1 and no lower payoff to all other types of agent 1 and all types of agent 2 (since it
must satisfy (EPIR2
M¯
)) than M¯ . Since M¯ is RCP, this implies there exists a mechanism
that implements V ∗ but generates higher total surplus than M¯ , which contradicts the fact
that M¯ efficiently implements V ∗. We thus conclude that M¯ is RSW ∗ relative to M¯ .


















We claim that M¯ solves [IE0]. First, since M¯ is noncollusive optimal and RCP, any real-
locational manipulation of M¯ guarantees V ∗ to the principal. If there exists a mechanism
M˜ ∈ RMM¯ that solves [IE0] and yields agent 1 a higher (ex ante) payoff than M¯ , then M˜
is feasible and Pareto-dominates M¯ since the former yields agent 2 no less payoff than the
latter (due to a constraint in [IE0]) and yields the principal V ∗ (since M¯ is RCP), which
contradicts that M¯ efficiently implements V ∗. Thus, M¯ must solve [IE0]. Let λ(θ1) ≥ 0
denote the Lagrangean multiplier associated with individual rationality of agent 1’s type
44That the RSW ∗ mechanism satisfies (IC1) can be checked easily and is established in Proposition 1 of
Maskin and Tirole (1992). That it satisfies (IC2) follows from (EPIC2), which is required for [RSW ∗θ1(M¯)].
For each θ1 ∈ Θ1, a solution to [RSW ∗θ1(M¯)] must satisfy (IR) since it satisfies (EPIR2M¯ ), and we conclude
that it must give at least the payoff of UM¯1 (θ1) ≥ U1(θ1) to agent 1 with type θ1 ∈ Θ1.
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1 (θ1, θ2|θ1, θ2)
)
subject to




from which it follows that M¯ solves [IE∗(µ01; M¯)] for w1(θ1) := p
0
1(θ1)+λ(θ1), θ1 ∈ Θ1. We
thus conclude that M¯ is IE∗ relative to the true prior µ01, which is positive.
Theorem 1∗ of Maskin and Tirole (1992) then implies that, given the grand mechanism
M¯ , the null side contract is supported as a PBE of the collusion game proposed by agent
1, supported by the “passive belief” that the status quo M¯ will be truthfully implemented,
following (an out-of-equilibrium) rejection of the collusion offer.45
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium strategies, given grand mechanism M∗, are described as follows: Agent 1
proposes the null side contract, and the contract is accepted by all other agents, whereafter
each agent reports truthfully in M∗. If agent 1 offers a non-null contract, then each agent
best responds to the following off-the-equilibrium belief: (1) Following agent 1’s devation,
each agent i 6= 1 believes that agent 1 is of such a type that would benefit strictly from
deviation, and that any other agent, agent j(6= 1, i), will accept the deviation offer if he is
of such a type that would be (weakly) better off from accepting it. (2) Following a rejection
of any side contract proposed by agent 1, each agent holds the passive belief and reports
truthfully when playing M∗, so M∗ is truthfully implemented.
We show that there is no profitable deviation for agent 1. Suppose to the contrary that
a positive measure of types of agent 1 is better off deviating to propose a non-null side
contract. For the deviation to be profitable, it must be accepted by a positive measure
of other agents’ types that get weakly better off by doing so, given the specified belief
following that deviation. Let Θ1 denote the set of agent 1’s types that are deviating,
45Formally, Maskin and Tirole treat the status quo mechanism as “exogenous.” But the status quo
outcome in some applications of theirs, such as contract renegotiation, is a result of some endogenous play
much like in our context. A similar restriction of “passive” beliefs will be required to support the claimed
equilibrium in those circumstances.
44
and let Θi with i 6= 1 denote the set of agent i’s types that are accepting the deviation.
Let Θ :=
∏
i∈N Θi, and define Θ−i and Θ−i−j as usual. Also, let M˜ = (q˜, t˜) ∈ RMM∗
denote the mechanism/outcome being implemented via the deviation side contract. Let
u¯Mi (θ) := si(q(θ), θ) + ti(θ) denote the ex post payoff arising from outcome M = (q, t).
For the deviation to be profitable for agent 1 with type θ1 ∈ Θ1, we must have
E
[
u¯M˜1 (θ˜)1{θ˜−1∈Θ−1} + u¯
M∗
1 (θ˜)1{θ˜−1 /∈Θ−1}
∣∣∣θ˜1 = θ1] > E [u¯M∗1 (θ˜)∣∣∣θ˜1 = θ1] . (27)
To understand the second term of the LHS, note that the deviation is rejected if θ˜−1 /∈ Θ−1





∣∣∣θ˜1 = θ1] > E [u¯M∗1 (θ˜)1{θ˜−1∈Θ−1}∣∣∣θ˜1 = θ1] .












For agent i 6= 1 with type θi ∈ Θi to accept the side contract, we must have46
E
[
u¯M˜i (θ˜)1{θ˜−i∈Θ−i} + u¯
M∗
i (θ˜)1{θ˜1∈Θ1,θ˜−1−i /∈Θ−1−i}
∣∣∣θ˜i = θi] ≥ E [u¯M∗i (θ˜)1{θ˜1∈Θ1}∣∣∣θ˜i = θi] ,




∣∣∣θ˜i = θi] ≥ E [u¯M∗i (θ˜)1{θ˜−i∈Θ−i}∣∣∣θ˜i = θi] .















































since M∗ satisfies (6) (or (11)), and M˜ ∈ RMM∗ . This contradicts (22).
46This inequality can be explained in a similar way to (27). Here, the RHS and the second term of the
LHS follow from the fact that agent i’s belief in (1) is correct about what types of agent 1 would make the
deviation offer and what types of each agent j 6= 1, i would accept or reject it.
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